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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order granting suppression of 
evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs 
Deputy Dustin Pulley received a call from sheriffs dispatch that a neighbor 
was reporting two gunshots inside a trailer at his trailer park. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 10, 
L. 8 - p. 11, L. 12.) The same neighbor, Jaime Allpress, reported a few minutes 
later that the trailer's occupant, Larry Ashworth, had left the trailer in a blue 1984 
pickup with license plates 6C 24694. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 11, Ls. 13-17; p. 12, L. 23 - 
p. 14, L. 1) Based on Allpress's information, Deputy Pulley located the pickup at 
the Weippe Senior Center. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 14, Ls. 10-15) Allpress reported that 
Ashworth was extremely intoxicated and had gone to attend an Alcoholics 
Anonymous meeting at the Weippe Senior Center. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 1 I, L. 18 - p. 
12, L. 22; p. 14, Ls. 2-9.) 
Deputy Pulley and Detective Jared knocked on the door of the Weippe 
Senior Center, and Bill Barteaux, the leader of an Alcohoiics Anonymous meeting 
answered. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 14, L. 13 - p. 16, L. 24.) Barteaux informed the 
officers that Ashworth was "four sheets to the wind, and really drunk," but 
assured the officers that everything was "under control" and that the AA group 
could "handle this." (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 16, L. 25 - p. 17, L. 3.) Detective Jared 
instructed Barteaux to step aside. (R., p. 5.) The officers then entered the 
building and instructed Ashworth to step outside with them. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 17, 
Ls. 4-1 1 .) 
Once outside Ashworth admitted drinking. (R., p. 5.) He also admitted 
driving to the senior center. (R., p. 5.) Ashworth smelled strongly of an alcoholic 
beverage, had unsure balance, bloodshot eyes, and his speech was slurred. (R., 
p. 5.) Ashworth failed field sobriety tests and was arrested for DUI. (R., pp. 5-6.) 
He ultimately tested at ,2741.2361.243 percent breath alcohol content. (R., pp. 7, 
10.) 
The state charged Ashworth with felony DUI due to a prior DUI conviction 
and for alcohol concentration in excess of .20. (R., p. 34.) Ashworth moved to 
suppress all evidence arising from his detention. (R., pp. 42-50.) Afier a hearing 
see generally Tr.), the district court granted the motion to suppress (R., pp. 55- (- 
62). The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Ashworth 
had been driving under the influence, that Ashworth enjoyed an expectation of 
privacy in the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting at the Weippe Senior Center, and 
that there was no exigency that justified entry into the senior center. (R., pp. 55- 
62.) The state filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 64-67.) 
Did the district court err in concluding that Ashworth had a privacy interest 
that prevented the officers from contacting him during an Alcoholics Anonymous 
meeting at the Weippe Senior Center? 
ARGUMENT 
Ashworth Had No Privacy Interest That Was lnfrinaed Bv Police Entry Into The 
Weippe Senior Center To Conduct Their lnvestiaation 
A. Introduction 
The only evidence even arguably relevant to whether Ashworth had a 
privacy interest that was infringed when the officers entered the Weippe Senior 
Center to talk to Ashworth was that there was an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting 
going on there. (Tr., p. 16, L. 4 - p. 17, L. 6.) Ashworth presented no evidence 
of what the Weippe Senior Center is, or who has access to it. He presented no 
evidence that Alcoholics Anonymous meetings are closed to the public. 
Despite this lack of evidence, the court held that Ashworth, solely by his 
status as an attendee at an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, enjoyed both a 
subjective and an objective expectation of privacy. (R., pp. 59-60.) The court 
further held that the officers lacked probable cause at the time they entered the 
building to seize Ashworth, and therefore the entry was not justified by the 
exigent circumstances exception. (R., pp. 60-62.) The district court erred in both 
of these holdings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whethe; constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 
306, 309 (2004). However, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in 
the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 ldaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 
(1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 ldaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The appellate court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court 
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 ldaho 215, 218, 984 
P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
C. Ashworth Had No Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy Violated By Police 
Action 
The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon an 
individual's reasonable expectations of privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 177 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); State v. 
Hanson, 142 ldaho 711, 716, 132 P.3d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 2006). Thus, when 
moving to suppress evidence, the defendant has the threshold burden of 
demonstrating that his legitimate privacy interests were infringed. Rawlinus v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); State v. Holland, 135 ldaho 159, 162, 15 
P.3d 1167, 1170 (2000); Hanson, 142 ldaho at 717, 132 P.3d at 474. The test is 
whether a defendant seeking suppression had a subjective expectation of privacy 
that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. State v. Morris, 131 ldaho 562, 
565, 961 P.2d 653, 656 (Ct. App. 1998). "Since an illegal search violates the 
rights only of those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or 
property searched, only those with such a privacy interest may obtain 
suppression of the fruits of the search." State v. Foldesi, 132 ldaho 778, 780, 
963 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Ct. App. 1998). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
133-34 (1978); Hanson, 142 ldaho at 717, 132 P.3d at 474. To show a Fourth 
Amendment privacy expectation the defendant must demonstrate both an actual, 
subjective expectation of privacy and that such expectation of privacy, when 
viewed objectively, was reasonable under the circumstances. Smith v. Marvland, 
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); State v. Wilkins, 125 ldaho 215, 222, 868 P.2d 1231, 
1238 (1 994). 
In addressing the privacy issue the district court made three distinct errors. 
First, the district court treated the lack of a privacy interest as a warrant exception 
and placed the burden of proof on the state. (R., p. 59.) The judge's belief that 
lack of privacy was a warrant exception instead of a threshold inquiry upon which 
Ashworth had the burden of proof, see Rawlinqs, 448 U.S. at 104; Holland, 135 
ldaho at 162, 15 P.3d at 1170; Hanson, 142 ldaho at 717, 132 P.3d at 474, 
makes his analysis erroneous as a matter of law. 
Second, the court's determination that Ashworth had a subjective 
expectation of privacy is clearly erroneous because Ashworth presented no 
evidence whatsoever to meet his burden of proof. Although Ashworth took the 
stand, he never testified that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
town's senior center. (Tr., p. 4, L. 20 - p. 9, L. 21.) Nor did he present any 
evidence about the nature of Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, such as whether 
they are open to anyone or are some sort of exclusive club requiring 
membership. (a generally Tr.) All factual findings by the district court 
regarding whether Ashworth had a subjective expectation of privacy and 
regarding the nature of Alcoholics Anonymous meetings are without any support 
in the evidence, and are therefore clearly erroneous. 
Third, the district court misapplied the reasonableness standard. The 
district court stated that the test was "society's understanding of the privacy 
afforded by attendance at an AA meeting," and "[tlhe nature of Alcoholics 
Anonymous conveys an objective understanding of a group that protects the 
anonymity of its members." (R., pp. 59-60.) That Alcoholics Anonymous tries to 
convey a certain amount of anonymity in their meetings does not mean that 
society recognizes those meetings beyond the scope of the police intrusion in 
this case. Indeed, any criminal syndicate tries to achieve anonymity; this does 
not mean that meetings of conspiracies are necessarily blanketed with Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
Of course Alcoholics Anonymous is not a criminal syndicate. The error of 
the district court is nevertheless clear: The desire of anonymity of the 
organization holding the meeting does not mean that the attending members are 
vested with a privacy interest recognized as reasonable by society. 
Here there is no evidence of why the meeting was a meeting that society 
would believe was sufficiently private that police could not intrude for the limited 
purpose of seizing a suspected drunk driver. It does not appear that modern 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes the right of sanctuary; the ability to 
flee to a place (such as a church or, apparently, an Alcoholics Anonymous 
meeting) where the government may never intrude. 
In this case there is no evidence that anyone wanting to attend this 
meeting would have been barred. There is no evidence that someone walking in 
off the streets would have been prevented from doing so. There is no evidence 
that Ashworth subjectively believed that the meeting was not open to the public. 
In short, there was no evidence justifying the district court's finding that the 
Fourth Amendment applied to the officer's conduct of walking into the town 
senior center during an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting to take Ashworth into 
custody. 
D. Even If There Were A Privacy Riaht, Entrv Was Justified By Exiqent 
Circumstances 
Dissipation of evidence of alcohol in the blood triggers the exigent 
circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757 (1966) (officers did not need search warrant to draw blood to preserve 
evidence of blood alcohol content). This exigent circumstances exception also 
justifies entry into a home to take custody of a suspect to preserve evidence of 
the presence and amount of alcohol if the officers have probable cause to believe 
that the suspect has committed the crime of DUI. State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 
496, 163 P.3d 1208 (Ct. App. 2007). The facts of this case show that the police 
had probable cause to believe Ashworth had been driving under the influence 
and that evidence of that crime would dissipate, creating an exigency that 
allowed entry into the senior center without a search warrant. 
The facts as found by the district court: 
On May 5, 2008, Clearwater County Deputy Dustin Pulley 
responded to a report of gunshots fired inside a residence at the 
Lombard Trailer Park. Deputy Pulley was advised that the 
suspected shooter was intoxicated. While en route to the scene, 
Deputy Pulley was contacted a second time by the Sheriff's Office 
dispatcher. He was informed that the original reporting party, 
identified as Jamie Allpress, had reported the suspect, Larry 
Ashworth, had left the residence in a blue 1984 Chevrolet pickup, 
license number 6024694, and driven to an Alcoholics Anonymous 
(AA) meeting in Weippe. Sixteen minutes after the initial call, 
Deputy Pulley and Detective Mitch Jared arrived at the Weippe 
Senior Citizens' Center, the site of the AA meeting. They located a 
blue pickup bearing license plate number 6624694 in the parking 
lot. 
Deputies Jared and Pulley then knocked on the door of the 
Senior Center, and were met by Bill Barteaux, the AA group leader. 
Mr. Barteaux informed the deputies that Mr. Ashworth was 
intoxicated and that the matter was "under control." Detective 
Jared informed Mr. Barteaux that he "needed to step aside and 
allow [the officers] to speak with Larry" and threatened "further 
action" if Mr. Barteaux failed to comply. Detective Jared entered 
the building and asked Mr. Ashworth to step outside with him. 
(R., pp. 55-56.) These facts show probable cause. 
The standards for probable cause were set forth in State v. Kvsar, 116 
Idaho 992,783 P.2d 859 (1989): 
Reasonable or probable cause for an arrest exists where the officer 
possesses information that would lead a person of ordinary care 
and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong 
suspicion that the person arrested is guilty. In evaluating a police 
officer's determination of probable cause in the field, a court must 
take into account "the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act." In determining whether there is probable cause 
for an arrest, an officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences 
from the available information in light of the knowledge that he has 
gained from his previous experience and training. 
Id. at 993, 783 P.2d at 860 (citations omitted). The statements by Jaime Allpress -
were that Ashworth was intoxicated and drove from his home to an Alcoholics 
Anonymous meeting in a certain pickup truck. The officers were able to find the 
exact truck described by Allpress at the senior center where the meeting was 
being held. Bill Barteaux confirmed that the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting was 
at that location and that Ashworth was present and was intoxicated. This 
evidence in the possession of the officers would lead a person of ordinary care 
and prudence to believe that Ashworth was guilty of DUI. 
The district court found no probable cause, however, because "the officers 
did not corroborate any information that would support probable cause by fheir 
personal observafion prior to entering the Senior Citizens' Center." (R., p. 61 
(emphasis added).) This reasoning fails as a matter of law and fact. 
The analysis fails as a matter of law because an officer may have 
probable cause without "personal observation." Indeed, where "information 
comes from a known citizen informant rather than an anonymous tipster, the 
citizen's disclosure of her identity, which carries the risk of accountability if the 
allegations turn out to be fabricated, is generally deemed adequate to show 
veracity and reliability." Wilson v. ldaho Transp. Dep't, 136 ldaho 270, 274, 32 
P.3d 164, 168 (Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted); see also State v. Peterson, 133 
ldaho 44, 47, 981 P.2d 11 54, 11 57 (Ct. App. 1999). The court was wrong as a 
maiter of law in holding that personal observation of Ashworth's intoxication was 
a prerequisite to probable cause. 
The analysis also fails as a matter of fact because the facts found by the 
judge show more than sufficient "corroboration" of Allpress's statements. The 
officers were able to corroborate (by observation) the specific vehicle and the 
specific location that Allpress said Ashworth had driven to. In addition, 
Barteaux's statement that Ashworth was intoxicated was corroboration of 
Allpress's statement to the same effect. The word of two independent citizens 
that Ashworth was under the influence of alcohol was sufficient to establish 
probable cause that Ashworth was actually under the influence. 
The factual findings of the district court show that the officers had probable 
cause that Ashworth had driven under the influence and that evidence of alcohol 
in his blood and breath could be obtained, but that it was dissipating. Because 
the facts found by the court show probable cause, the district court erred as a 
matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order suppressing evidence arising from the detention of Ashworth. 
DATED this 28th day of May 2009. 
Deputy Attorney ~ e d e r 8  
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